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Abstract
The purpose of this study was to investigate the effect of emotional arousal on
memory. In part one the list wise directed forgetting (DF) method was used to investigate the
long term effects of attempting to suppress emotionally arousing pictures. The participants
were tested on two occasions, one week apart. The first test session replicated the findings in
Payne & Corrigan (2007), with no DF effect being found. No DF effect was found on the
second test, either, but a significant list difference was found, with lower means on list 2, than
list 1. There were no group differences at any stage of the experiment. In addition the negative
pictures were remembered better than the positive and neutral. Suppression of emotionally
arousing stimuli may thus seem to be difficult. Part two was an attempt to assess memory
quality, by asking participants to describe some of the pictures in detail. Memory for list 1
pictures, which were better remembered after a week, was less erroneous, than memory for
list 2 pictures. Memory for positive pictures was less erroneous than for the negative and
neutral. In addition an attempt to create memory errors was made, by presenting false titles of
different valences. Valence did not matter. Error rates were the same for the negative,
positive, and neutral title. Over all, memory errors were quite common. There was no group
difference for this tendency either.
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Introduction
We all have at one point in time had experiences that we wish we could forget. A
stutter during an important presentation, fainting in the middle of a crowd, or saying
something to someone we would rather have unsaid. Sadly, these memories tend to mark
themselves in memory, and sometimes we are unable to make them go away, even though we
try. Painful memories have an uncanny ability to seep into our dreams, and torment us in our
daily lives. This tendency led the great William James to assert that emotional memories seem
to “leave a scar upon the cerebral tissue” (James, 1890, p. 670, in Porter & Birt, 2001, p.102).
Even so, negative events can be forgotten (Epstein & Bottoms, 2002; McNally, 2003). Freud
(1856 – 1939) believed that our mind possesses unconscious defence mechanisms that are
able to ban unwanted, negative memories from consciousness, what he called repression.
Repression may be defined as a “motivational process that protects us by blocking the
conscious recall of anxiety-arousing material” (Passer & Smith, 2007, p. 256). Decades of
research on this phenomenon have challenged the existence of this mechanism, however (see
Klausen, 2009, for a review). Nowadays most researchers speak of suppression: “the
conscious attempts to expel disturbing material from awareness” (McNally, 2003, p. 169). If
we put our mind to it, we may by our own effort manage not to think about previous,
shameful incidents.
Various methods have been used in an attempt to pinpoint the assumed underlying
mechanisms involved in forgetting unwanted memories. These include the Think – no think,
(Anderson & Green, 2001; Depue, Banich & Curran, 2006), Retrieval induced forgetting
(RIF) (Anderson, Bjork & Bjork, 1994), Thought suppression (Wegner, Schneider, Carter &
White, 1987) and Directed forgetting (DF) (e.g. Basden & Basden, 1996; Bjork & Bjork,
2003) paradigms. The findings are mixed. Some studies using the think/no think -, directed
forgetting - and RIF - paradigms have found that negative stimuli can be suppressed or
inhibited (Anderson & Green, 2001; Anderson, Bjork & Bjork, 1994; Depue, Banich &
Curran, 2006; Wessel & Merckelbach, 2006).Yet others have failed to find an effect using
RIF and DF (Dehli & Brennen, 2009; Payne & Corrigan, 2007). In addition the suppression
effect found with the think/no-think and RIF methods seems to be of limited duration
(McLeod & Macrae, 2001; Nørby, Lange & Larsen, 2009). What, then, is it that enables us to
forget unwanted memories? Under what conditions do we succeed, and when will we be
unsuccessful? How easily do we forget? Does it matter what we attempt to forget, or do the
memory mechanisms work in the same way regardless?
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The directed forgetting method
One way of getting a possible answer to these questions is with the directed forgetting
method (DF). Directed forgetting refers to the phenomenon of “impaired memory arising
from an instruction to forget the unwanted material” (Anderson, 2005, cited in Geraerts &
McNally, 2008, p. 615). In this paradigm participants are traditionally asked to study lists of
words and then instructed to forget part of the stimulus material (e.g. Geraerts & McNally,
2008). There are two types of the DF method: the item based and the list-wise method. In the
item based each stimulus is marked immediately after presentation as something to be
remembered or forgotten, usually indicated with the letter R for remember or F for forget. In
the list-wise method the stimuli is sorted into two lists. The entire first list is presented before
half of the participants (the Forget group) are instructed to forget this list and only learn the
second list, while the other half (Remember group) are instructed to remember both lists
(Marks & Dulaney, 2001). The usual finding is that the Forget group recalls less of the to-be-
forgotten (TBF) words in list 1, and more of the to-be-remembered (TBR) words in list 2 than
the Remember group, on recall tasks. Conversely, the Remember group usually remembers
more from list 1 than from list 2 (Conway, Harries, Noyes, Racsmány & Frankish, 2000;
Geraerts & McNally, 2008), probably due to a proactive interference from the preceding list
(Payne & Corrigan, 2007). This pattern has been labelled the directed forgetting effect, and is
usually weaker in the list method than in the item method (Geraerts & McNally, 2008).
Another difference between the two methods is the observation that the DF effect is
also found in recognition tasks with the item based method, but not the list-wise method. For
this reason it is assumed that two different mechanisms underlie each method. The effects on
the item based method are thought to stem from selective rehearsal of the stimulus. Receiving
an instruction to forget immediately after the presentation of the stimulus might make the
participants stop rehearsing the stimulus, and focus their efforts on learning the TBR items
instead. This might lead to a disrupted encoding process for the TBF items, and the material is
thus not properly stored in memory. Hence, there are no memory to be retrieved at either
recall or recognition tasks (Bjork, 1970; Geraerts & McNally, 2007). In the list-wise method
the material to be forgotten has been presented in full before the forget instruction, and the
stimuli is thus assumed to have been properly encoded. Had it not been then no return of
memory could occur at recognition tasks. The lack of memory on tests of recall is thus
assumed to stem from retrieval inhibition. The return of memory on the recognition task
could therefore stem from a change in retrieval abilities, possibly a “release” from inhibition
(Basden & Basden, 1996). The return of forgotten material indicates that it is still stored in
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memory, but access has been temporarily blocked, until a potent release cue is provided
(Payne & Corrigan, 2007). Because the list-wise method is assumed to involve inhibition it
seems suitable for studying the effect of attempting to suppress or forget unwanted memories.
This study will thus utilize this method to further explore the conditions under which
forgetting may occur or, alternatively, when forgetting is difficult. Henceforth, when the DF
method is discussed it refers to the list-wise.
The DF effect has been found to depend on certain conditions to occur. One condition
that has been identified is the learning of a second list (Gelfand & Bjork, 1985, cited in
Pastötter & Bäuml, 2007). The DF effect is thought to stem from a redirecting of attention
away from the items in the TBF list. The observed disruption in inhibition of list 1 items when
attentional resources are depleted, working on additional tasks during list 2 learning, seems to
support this hypothesis (Conway, et al., 2000). In relation to this: when Wegner Schneider,
Carter and White (1987), in their thought suppression study, instructed their participants not
to think about a white bear while performing a different task, the participants were
unsuccessful unless they were given a distractor they could focus their attention on (a red
Volkswagen; experiment 2). Without the distractor those instructed to suppress the thought of
a white bear in the first part of the study experienced a “rebound effect” in part two of the
study, when they were allowed to think of it again. They reported more thoughts of the bear,
than a group who started by expressing thoughts about it (prior to a suppression period,
experiment 1). It may thus seem like we are able to forget things we do not wish to think
about if we manage to distract ourselves. Note however, that the thought to be suppressed in
the Wegner et al. (1987) study was not emotional.
There is one issue that makes it difficult to draw a clear inference from the studies
using directed forgetting method to how  it may be possible to inhibit or suppress unwanted
emotional memories, though. Traditionally these studies have used lists of words, and there is
reason to doubt the ecological validity of using this form of stimulus material to describe
autobiographical events. The generalizability of the traditional directed forgetting studies is
thus questionable (e.g. Jocelyn & Oakes, 2005; Payne & Corrigan, 2007). Payne and Corrigan
pointed out: “Though words like [“sex” and “death”] certainly convey emotional information,
by themselves they produce very little emotion” (Payne & Corrigan, 2007, p. 782). In support
of this Wessel and Merchelbach (2006) found that forgetting emotional words were no more
difficult than forgetting neutral words.
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Following their hypothesis that emotional words may not be suitable for studying
forgetting of emotional events Payne and Corrigan (2007) used pictures as their stimulus
material. They wanted to investigate whether intentionally forgetting emotional events was
just as easy as forgetting mundane ones. They chose 32 emotional pictures (16 negative and
16 positive) and 32 neutral pictures, and divided them into 4 lists in total: two emotional and
two neutral. Each picture was given a unique verbal title to enable verbal recall. The lists were
presented as equal or unequal valence (neu – neu, neu – emo, emo – emo, emo – neu). When
the first list was neutral (neu – neu or neu – emo) the standard directed forgetting effect
occurred, with less items from list 1 being recalled by the forget group. When the first list was
emotional on the other hand (emo – emo, emo – neu) no DF effect was found. In fact, the
emotional pictures seemed to be favoured in memory and inhibition failed to occur. Payne and
Corrigan (2007) argued that the previous findings of directed forgetting for emotional words
might be because words only “elicit thoughts about emotional concepts, rather than elicit
emotional states” (p.784, italics mine), which might be essential to the difference between
neutral and emotional stimuli (Payne & Corrigan, 2007). When something causes emotional
arousal, we seem unable to suppress it.
Besides the issues with emotional arousal there are other reasons why using pictures
are more expedient than using words. Words may convey meaning, and cause the participants
to imagine a scene relating to that word. These scenes will be unique in each participant’s
mind, though, lacking standardization. In the sense they only remember the word (echoic
representation, e.g. Passer & Smith, 2007), and no imagination of a visual scene occurs, it
becomes difficult to generalize to autobiographical memory (AM), which is unquestionably
visual in nature. Providing pictures eases generalization.
There is also reason to believe that our visual memory system is more accurate than
verbal memory. Shephard (1967) tested peoples’ memory accuracy for words, sentences and
pictures. After having been presented for the test stimuli the participants were presented with
a selection of the previously seen stimuli paired with a new stimulus, in a forced choice task,
and asked the participants to identify the “old” stimulus. When the stimuli were pictures he
found a 98% correct response rate when the participants were tested immediately after
presentation. When tested after a week’s delay, the group who saw the pictures was as
accurate as the groups who studied verbal material (words and sentences) had been at the first
test session, immediately after presentation (pictures 87% after 7 days; words 88.4% &
sentences 89% on first test). In other words: after one week visual memory was as accurate as
verbal memory had been shortly after presentation of the stimulus. This indicates a relatively
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powerful and enduring impact of pictures on memory. Other studies have confirmed the long
term accuracy of visual memory (Jiang, Song & Rigas, 2005; Voght & Magnussen, 2007).
It does not take the visual system long to register the gist of a visual scene (Oliva,
2005; Wolfe, 1998), i.e. the abstract meaning, such as whether it depicts a kitchen, a beach, or
a supermarket (Rensink, 2000). Visual memory also has a high capacity for spatial context
learning (Jiang, Song & Rigas, 2005). In studies using even thousands of pictures, people are
able to recognize the ones they have seen in the past from the newly presented pictures (see
Wolfe, 1998 for a review). It thus seems reasonable to assume that words may be inadequate
for drawing inferences about AM.
To reiterate: the DF effect has been observed for emotional words, but not emotional
pictures. Since the aim is to pinpoint the underlying mechanisms for forgetting emotional
memories, the best stimulus material would perhaps be real autobiographical memories
(AMs)? Interestingly, the two studies that have used AMs in a list-wise DF experiment did
find a DF effect (Barnier, et al., 2007; Jocelyn & Oakes, 2005). Barnier et al. (2007) asked
their participants to generate AMs relating to specific cue words, and then used these
memories in a standard list-wise method. However, they asked the participants to generate
memories that were at least 1 month old (Barnier et al., 2007), and emotional characteristics
of memory for the events may have declined sufficiently to enable DF inhibition. Jocelyn and
Oakes (2005), however, used fairly new autobiographical material (diary entries for two
consecutive weeks). Half of the participants received an instruction after the first week to
forget all of the existing diary entries, and only concentrate on remembering the upcoming
week’s events, while the other half were told to remember both weeks. They found a DF
effect for emotional events, with negative and positive, and both high and low salient
memories, forgotten to an equal extent (experiment 1). This may indicate that negative
memories are relatively easy to forget.
There is a slight methodological problem with using autobiographical material though.
Because the events the participants reported in the Jocelyn and Oakes (2005) study were not
“standardized” (they were to keep a diary for whatever took place in their lives), offering less
control, it is difficult to generalize from this study (e.g. Barnier et al., 2007). The lack of
standardization also makes it somewhat unclear exactly how arousing, or frequent (among the
participants), the emotional events were. We usually don’t experience very emotionally
arousing events on a regular basis, and it may be that these events work differently than more
low key, everyday events (e.g. Alexander et al. 2005; Berntsen, 2001; Porter & Birt, 2001;
Payne & Corrigan, 2007). Barnier et al. (2007) did explore emotional events, and also scored
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them on intensity, but they do not clearly specify if this variable was taken into account,
leaving this factor potentially unexplored. Although the Jocelyn and Oakes (2005) and
Barnier et al. (2007) studies clearly indicate that AMs can be forgotten, they may not be
suited for clarifying how emotionality may mediate the forgetting process. However, in
experiment 2, in the Jocelyn and Oakes (2005) study, the week to be forgotten included
Valentines Day, and the events were scored as slightly higher on arousal than the previous
week. In this experiment they did not find any DF effect for the high salience events. This
may indicate that highly arousing events are harder to forget. However, since the salient
events reported seemed to have been primarily positive in nature (Jocelyn & Oakes, 2005),
and we may not be very motivated to forget positive memories1 (e.g. Payne & Corrigan, 2007,
Plutchik, 2001) the issue of negative events may still be an open issue.
Another problem with most studies using DF is that they have only tested the
participants shortly after the presentation period (e.g. Barnier et al., 2007; Conway et al.,
2000; Pastötter & Bäuml, 2007; Payne & Corrigan, 2007; Wessel & Merckelbach, 2006).
Considering the annulment of suppression in studies using other methods to investigate
related paradigms (c.f. MacLeod & Macrae, 2001; Nørby, Lange & Larsen, 2009), it stands to
reason that some alteration of memory may be observed with the directed forgetting method
too after a delay. Considering that no DF effect was observed for the emotional first list in the
Payne and Corrigan (2007) study, it could be that inhibitory mechanisms need more time to
suppress visual, emotionally arousing, stimuli. MacLeod and Macrae (2001) and Nørby,
Lange and Larsen (2009) used words as their stimulus material, and it is possible that visual
memory operates differently. Pictures are thought to be more suited to provoke an emotional
activation than are words (Payne & Corrigan, 2007), and it seems like emotional activation
may be a key factor in the DF effect.
If the DF paradigm is going to be used as a tool to investigate the long term effects of
attempting to suppress (i.e. intentionally forget) emotionally salient autobiographical
memories it has to be made more ecologically valid, first of all by replacing words with visual
stimuli (as in Payne & Corrigan, 2007) in order to investigate the role of emotional arousal,
and secondly by investigating the long term effects (this study). Although Jocelyn and Oakes
(2005) tested the participants some time after the forget instruction, the lack of
standardization makes it difficult to pinpoint the exact factors that mediated the DF effect in
that study (e.g. Barnier et al., 2007). Although AMs are undeniably more ecologically valid
than pictures that lack self referential qualities (i.e. the participants have not taken part in the
1 Positive emotions may signal approach behaviour, while negative emotions may signal avoidance.
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activities they witness) using pictures is a necessary step towards an integrated understanding
of how memory operates.
Memory quality
Another benefit from using pictures as the stimulus material is that it enables an
investigation of the quality of the memory representations of the stimulus. The directed
forgetting method have primarily measured peoples’ verbal memory, or in cases where
pictures are used; people’s verbal memory of visual scenes (e.g. Payne & Corrigan, 2007). I.e.
it indicates how good we are at remembering the gist/category name of a scene, but does not
tell us if the scene itself, as it is portrayed in our mind, is correct or not. If the participants
correctly remember the title “father and son” we don’t know if they remember them in the
correct setting, with the correct clothes, or the correct age. In addition, it is possible that visual
memory may be altered by an attempt to suppress what we have seen. If so, memory quality
for the pictures will not be the same for the Forget and the Remember group, on list 1.
The design of this study also enables an additional analysis: just how easy is it to
create errors in someone’s memory? This addition is inspired by the controversy surrounding
repression and false memories. A false memory can be defined as: a “memory of an event that
never took place” (Sivers, Schooler & Freyd, 2002). In the 80s and 90s a group of men and
women claimed to have had repressed memories of being sexually abused in childhood,
which they, years later, had supposedly recovered in therapy (McNally, 2003). The debate
that ensued concerned whether or not these memories could inadvertently have been created
in the therapy setting, by methods now considered to have been suggestive in nature, and in
fact had been false memories (Loftus & Ketcham, 1994; McNally, 2003; Schacter, 2001).
Suggestibility concerns “an individual’s tendency to incorporate misleading information from
external sources – other people, written materials or pictures, even the media – into personal
recollections” (Schacter, 2001, p. 113). The therapists, on the other hand, rejected the notion
of false memories arising in therapy (Schacter, 1996, p. 250).
Since then a great number of studies have demonstrated that planting false memories
is possible. Elizabeth Loftus, a pioneer within false memory research, and colleagues have
been able to alter memory in a variety of settings: from changing memory for details of a
witnessed event (Loftus & Hoffman, 1989; Loftus & Palmer, 1974; Zhu, Chen, Loftus, Lin &
Dong, 2009; Zhu et al., 2010), to even creating false autobiographical memories in the
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participants (Loftus & Pickrell, 1995). Other researchers have replicated both the method2 and
the results (Chan, Thomas, Bulevich, 2009), even for assumed unpleasant and traumatic
autobiographical events (Hyman, Husband & Billings, 1995; Porter, Yuille & Lehman, 1999).
Most of the studies have presented a false narrative to coax the participants into believing they
experienced the event, but also manipulated photographs have been employed (Wade, Garry,
Read & Lindsay, 2002). Garry and Wade (2005), however, discovered that false narratives
were better at creating false memories than false photographs were. This might indicate that
memory for pictorial stimuli are relatively more accurate than verbal memory.
The body of past research have demonstrated that memory is rather malleable, and that
even major alterations may be achieved with fairly simple methods. However, it is still
unclear just how easily a memory error may be created. The previous studies have relied on
providing the participants with already constructed notions of what may have happened, for
their imagination to build on. Creating false autobiographical memories have additionally
involved a certain amount of social pressure, in telling the participants that family members
had confirmed that the events had occurred (e.g. Loftus & Pickrell, 1995; Hyman, Husband &
Billings, 1995; Porter, Yuille & Lehman, 1999; Wade, Garry, Read & Lindsay, 2002; Garry
& Wade, 2005). With a minimum of external information, and a minimum of social pressure,
do errors still occur? Is it possible to make people believe they have seen pictures that have in
fact never been presented to them, and to describe them in detail?
The present study
The purpose of the present study is thus twofold: part one is an investigation of the
long term effects of a pictorial, emotionally arousing, version of the list wise directed
forgetting method, using the Payne and Corrigan (2007) study as a starting point. Various
issues have been altered in order to make the study as ecologically valid as possible. Part two
of the study is an attempt to investigate the qualitative aspects of the memory representations,
in addition to attempt to find out how easily memory errors may be created.
When it comes to the DF part of the experiment the most important change is adding a
second test session, a week after presentation, in order to investigate the long term effects of
2 Using the ‘standard’ method, where the participants are asked to choose between an object they have seen in a
picture and the object presented in the misleading narrative, in a forced choice recognition task. McCloskey and
Zaragoza (1985) criticized this technique and proposed a new modified version, where participants were asked to
choose between the seen object and an unrelated object not presented in either picture or narrative. They did not
observe any misinformation effect. However, this method has again been criticized as not being sensitive enough
(see Loftus, 1991, for a review).
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attempting to suppress unwanted stimuli. This is done to see if memory for the negative
pictures has changed in any way during the delay. Does an instruction to forget weaken the
processing of the events in the long run, thus lessen the brains ability to retain the memories,
or are negative events properly encoded, stored, and readily retrievable no matter what? Since
the directed forgetting effect is not expected to occur at the first testing, could it be present
after a week? Alternatively, if an effect is unexpectedly obtained at the initial testing, has it
disappeared after a week?
Secondly, Payne and Corrigan (2007) used all emotional and all neutral lists. This
gives an indication of the superiority of emotional events in memory over mundane events.
However, this may be a somewhat artificial “situation”, as we tend to experience several
events of various emotional valences during our daily lives, and all these events will compete
with each other for access to conscious recollection (e.g. Smith & Kosslyn, 2009). The
present study thus includes negative, positive and neutral pictures in both lists (as in Barnier
et al.’s, 2007, study, experiment 3), in an attempt to make the study more similar to daily life
experiences. The primary interest is memory for the negative pictures compared to the
positive and neutral ones.
Thirdly; this study only include pictures of humans in various, unique situations. The
use of only situational pictures gives a better basis for generalizing to real life settings.
Whenever someone attempts to suppress memories these may usually be social in nature. The
participants will also be asked to describe some of the situations depicted in the pictures. This
is to investigate whether pictures the participants have been told to forget, are more, or less,
correct compared to pictures they are instructed to remember, after a certain delay. This might
answer whether the inhibitory processes thought to result from an instruction to forget (e.g.
Payne & Corrigan, 2007) might weaken the retrieval abilities for the forget-pictures in the
time between the presentation stage and the second retrieval stage, compared to remember-
pictures, and compared to the control (Remember) group, thus making memory more
incorrect.
Unrelated to the Payne and Corrigan (2007) study, but to link the study to research on
the creation of false memories, the present study will also attempt to find out if mildly
influential suggestions are enough to create memory errors for false (not previously
presented) picture titles. Of additional interest is whether this will be easier for titles
indicating a benign (positive or neutral) situation, rather than a negative one. More precisely:
will merely presenting a title be enough to make the participants attempt to describe the
picture, as if they had seen it? Additionally, will the tendency to form memory errors differ
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for the Forget and Remember groups? Presenting the same pictures to all participants enables
this additional investigation. The titles are constructed to be mildly associated with the
original pictures.
The rationale for combining the list-wise DF method with a study on memory errors
is, as previously mentioned, the assumption that this method involves retrieval inhibition of
the studied material (e.g. Basden & Basden, 1996), and would thus allow an investigation into
the nature of material one has been explicitly instructed to forget, and assumed to have
become inhibited. As it is further assumed that both picture lists have been equally processed,
the possibility that the forget list is unavailable in memory because it had never been encoded,
can be excluded. By combining this method with a measure of the quality of details in
memory could give an indication of how trying to forget something might affect memory for
it, compared to the things one have tried to remember. Do people in the forget condition have
more correct memories for the pictures they had been instructed to forget, because they have
been “locked in” somehow, or do they contain more errors, due to weakened memory traces?
Consequently, are the pictures they were told to remember recalled more correctly, because
they do not have to compete with other memories? Which group is more likely to accept the
false probes? Does the feeling of having forgotten something make the forget group more
likely to believe that the false titles had been presented? Considering that no DF effect is
expected on the first test session, the answers to these questions hinge on the results at the
second testing.
The erroneous descriptions given to the false titles (and also the true, original titles) in
the present study are here referred to as memory errors rather than false memories. Some
studies using “technical” methods to create memory errors, such as the DRM-paradigm, have
claimed that the errors represent false memories (e.g. Watson, McDermot & Balota, 2004). It
is an open question, however, whether the term false memory should be reserved for false
autobiographical memories, since a dilution of the term may make theoretical discussions
somewhat confusing. This is not to say that the phenomena are not linked in any way. Every
false memory will at some point have started with a mere memory error.
Predictions
As in the Payne and Corrigan (2007) study the directed forgetting effect is not
expected to occur at the first testing. Concerning the second testing is seems reasonable to
assume that memory for the two lists remain stable during the 1 week delay, considering the
advantage of emotional stimuli in memory. Since negative material seems to be better
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remembered (e.g. Payne & Corrigan, 2007), it may further be assumed that negative pictures
will be harder to forget than neutral and positive pictures, even after the delay. Alternatively
there may be a decrease in mean values of equal strength in both lists, across all valences, in
accordance with general forgetting (e.g. Ebbinghaus’ forgetting curve, in Smith & Kosslyn,
2009). The latter hypothesis seems more likely considering the study does not involve
people’s AMs, which may be more memorable (e.g. Barnier et al., 2007) than pictures one has
merely looked at for a brief period of time.
Memory quality is expected to be related to the results on the DF task. Provided that
the DF effect appears on the second testing it seems plausible that memory for list 1 pictures
will be more accurate in the remember group, while list 2 pictures will be more accurate in the
forget group. If no group differences are found in the DF task on test 2, no group difference
should be found in the memory quality part.
Additionally, creating false responses for the titles indicating a negative scene ought to
be more difficult than for the positive and neutral titles. The negative pictures are assumed to
be more memorable, due to their relatively higher arousal (cf. table 1 below; additionally the
negative pictures were remembered better than the positive pictures in the Payne & Corrigan,
2007 study, even though they were of similar arousal), and the participants should realize that
they had not seen a picture depicting that particular scene. It is further assumed that the
participants will show a tendency of misattributing the false titles with the original pictures
that they are based on. Misattribution happens when information in memory is attributed to
the wrong source. It could be that we remember the details of an event correctly, but we may
mix up the dates for when it happened. We may also mistakenly believe that visual images in
our mind – which may have been created from something we have heard, seen, read in a
book, or dreamt up – have actually taken place (Schacter, 2001). Misattribution is sometimes
called source monitoring error (e.g. Lindsay, 1990), or source confusion (Passer & Smith,
2007). The latter term will be used here.
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Main experiment
This study used coloured photographs in a list-wise directed forgetting experiment to
explore the long term impact of emotional arousal on memory. The pictures were divided into
two separate lists, list A and list B3, matched on valence and arousal. The pictures depicted
humans in a social setting, and each picture was given a unique verbal title to enable verbal
recall. The titles were designed to capture the gist of the contents of the picture, without at the
same time giving away too much information. The titles were 1 – 3 words in length. A picture
showing a man and a woman having a conversation, over a cup of coffee, was simply titled
“man and woman” (see appendix for complete list). The participants were presented with both
lists, but presentation order was randomized.
Illustration photos of the type of picture the participants were asked to describe. Pictures are not part of the
database used in the study. Credits from left to right: Sara Atkins and Joe Mabel (pictures have been altered).
Licensed under the © Creative Commons Attribution 3.0 Licence.
The participants were randomly allocated to one of two conditions, Forget or
Remember. After the presentation of the first list the Forget group received an instruction to
forget this list, because it was only practice, and instructed to only remember the second one.
The Remember group was instructed to remember both the list they had just seen and the next
list to be presented. Memory for the verbal titles of the pictures was tested on two occasions,
3 Presentation order of list A and list B were counterbalanced. List A or B refers to the two separate picture lists,
while List 1 and 2 refers to the presentation order in the DF experiment, i.e. whether the list was presented before
or after the mid-test instruction. Both list A and list B were presented as list 1 or list 2.
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shortly after presentation and again after a week, to investigate the long term effects of the
suppression attempt.
In order to explore the qualitative properties of the memory representations some of
the pictures from both lists (1 of each valence), were selected to be more thoroughly
described. First the participants were given a recall task, where they were presented with a
title and asked to describe the picture that had been presented with that title, as detailed as
possible. They were casually encouraged to try to visualize the original picture before
describing it, since this might aid their recall. The descriptions were then matched to the
original picture to check for possible deviations. In case the participants failed to include all
of the details they remembered in the recall task a response booklet was provided afterwards,
containing open, non-leading questions probing for more specific details. The main reason for
this addition to the DF study was to further investigate the quality of the memory
representations of the presented pictures, and whether this would be different for people who
have attempted to suppress part of the study material compared those told to remember all of
it.
The design of this study also enabled an additional analysis concerning the creation of
memory errors. Three additional titles, indicating a negative, positive and a neutral scene,
were constructed, and presented with the true titles. The false titles were mildly associated
with some of the pictures that had been presented before. As well as being the basis for an
investigation into quality of visual memory, the original pictures also served to lend some
credibility to the false titles. Presenting titles participants had actually seen could make it
easier to make them believe that they had seen a picture with that title. It should be noted that
this study may contain too few pictures in the sample to make broad generalizations, but
could nonetheless be considered a first attempt to investigate these issues.
Method
Participants
The participants were 58 (38 female and 20 male) undergraduate students in psychology, at
the University of Oslo, who all volunteered for the study. They received no compensation for
participating. The participants were divided into a Forget condition (the experimental group)
and a Remember condition (the control group), with 29 in each. The participants were aged 19
– 31 years, with a mean age of 22 years. The participants were not recruited by gender, and
assignment to either category was purely random.
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Materials
All pictures were selected from the International Affective Picture System (IAPS)
database4, which have been standardized, on valence and emotional arousal. Arousal and
valence are scored on a likert scale ranging from 1-9 (1 = very low; 9 = very high arousal; 1 =
very negative, 9 = very positive valence) (Lang, Bradley & Cuthbert, 2008). The valence and
arousal categories have been found to correlate positively with measures of physiological
activation (Bradley, Greenwald, Petry & Lang, 1992). 6 negative, 6 positive and 6 neutral
pictures were selected, 18 in total5, and divided into two separate lists. The negative, positive
and neutral images in each list were matched on both valence and arousal (see table 1).
Table 1
Valence and arousal for picture lists
List A List B
Valence Arousal Valence Arousal
Negative 2.36 6.04 2.35 6.1
Positive 7.53 4.77 7.6 4.9
Neutral 5.14 3.72 5.04 3.76
A unique title was constructed for each picture (1-3 words) in order to separate them
from each other, and to enable verbal recall. For instance: a picture showing people on a roller
coaster were given the title “roller coaster”, and a picture of two children holding a kitten each
were given the title “children and cats”. The titles indicated plurality of a category, such as
‘children’ if there were more than one, but did not otherwise indicate any number of people or
objects. As in the Payne and Corrigan (2007) study if the participants could not remember the
correct title they were instructed to either indicate an approximate title or describe the picture.
Care was also taken to ensure that the pictures could not potentially overload the
participants’ memory, i.e. that the pictures were too detailed and complex. Only pictures
depicting a minimum of two people (to ensure some complexity), but no more than 7 central
persons (in accordance with “Miller’s (1956) magical number 7 ± 2”, cited in Passer & Smith,
4 We were permitted to use the pictures from the IAPS database in this research, but we were not permitted to
publish the pictures in the paper. The original pictures are thus described in the appendix, while the pictures
actually shown in this paper are for illustration purposes.
5 A separate study ran parallel to this that also used pictures from the IAPS database, and in addition recruited
from the same sample of students. The pool of possible pictures to select for this study was thus restricted, since
it was imperative that the participants had not potentially been exposed to the pictures previously.
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2007), were chosen to be presented at stage one. For the second, description stage of the
experiment only pictures with 2 - 3 individuals were chosen, again to lessen strain on
memory, and motivation.
Design and procedure
The participants were told that they were taking part in a study on long term memory for
images. They were instructed to remember the picture titles and details in the pictures for a
later memory task. Pictures and titles were presented on a computer monitor using E-prime
2.0 (Psychology Software Tools, Inc.). The pictures measured 22.5 by 28.2 cm, and the
participants were seated 60 - 80 cm from the computer monitor. The presentation of the
pictures was randomized within each list, and the presentation order of the two picture lists
was pre-randomized to exclude ‘list memorability’ as a confounding variable. The title of the
picture was presented by itself for 2 seconds, in black letters on a white computer screen,
before the title was presented in combination with the picture for another 3.5 seconds. The
title was presented on top of the picture. Each picture presentation was followed by a 1000 ms
inter stimulus interval. During this time a black fixation point was presented on a white screen
at the location of the appearance of the next title, to focus attention. The pre-presentation of
the titles was done to make sure that a seemingly lack of memory was not due to the
participants failing to register the title. The Payne and Corrigan (2007) study presented the
pictures, in combination with the titles for 2.5 seconds, but pilot testing of this experiment
indicated that this was not enough time to register any details in the pictures, and might
potentially cause the participants to fail to register the title. The presentation time was thus
extended in order to increase the likelihood that poor memory reflected a problem in retrieval,
and not encoding failure.
After studying the first list the group in the forget condition (the Forget group)
received an on-screen instruction that the first list was only a practice trial, and that they
should forget the list they had just seen and only remember the second list. The group in the
Remember condition (the Control group) was told after the first list that they were halfway in
the experiment, and that the second list would be presented shortly. The participants were
instructed to ‘press any key’ in order to continue the experiment. After the presentation of the
pictures was completed a filler task was introduced, asking the participants to write down as
many names of countries that they knew of. The filler task lasted two minutes, and upon its
completion they were asked to list all the picture titles that they could remember from both
lists. For the Forget group this included the list they had been instructed to forget.
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The total time for the presentation phase was 15 minutes. After the task was completed
a time for the second stage of the experiment was scheduled before the participants were
excused, after receiving instructions not to discuss the experiment with anyone, to avoid
external interference on memory (e.g. French, Gerry & Mori, 2008).
In the second stage, 1-2 weeks later, (M = 7.7 days, Range: 7 (76%) - 15) the
participants were first told to write down as many titles as they could remember from the first
stage, as part of the directed forgetting part of the experiment.
Afterwards, as part of the study on the quality of the memory representations, they
were presented with a recall task where 6 previously presented picture titles were presented
one at a time on a computer screen (using E-prime 2.0), in addition to the 3 false titles6 (1
indicating a negative picture, 1 positive and 1 neutral). The presentation was randomized by
the computer program. The participants were then instructed to describe the pictures
belonging to the title as detailed as they could, on the computer. After receiving information
about the steps of the experiment they were casually encouraged to “Close your eyes for half
a minute or so, after being presented with the title and just try to imagine the picture the title
belongs to. This may make it easier to remember details, and aid you in describing the
pictures”. The experimenter then left the room, to minimize external pressure and the risk of
experimenter bias. The participants were left alone in a closed off cubicle.
After the completion of the recall task they were given a response booklet with
questions that asked for more specific details, such as: “how many people (and animals) are
present?”, “describe looks, clothes and central objects” and “briefly describe the situation”.
The questionnaire was included in case these details had been left out of the descriptions in
the recall task, and the questions could also serve as a probe. This could therefore be
considered a cued recall task, although the questions did not offer any clues as to what the
correct answer might be. The experimenter again left the room, and the participants were free
to take the time they needed to complete the questionnaire. The memory error part of the
experiment lasted approximately 1 hour +/- 30 min. After the completion of the experiment
the participants were debriefed about the purpose of the study and the deception with the false
titles. They were also informed about the malleable nature of memory, and how common it is
to make memory errors. They were then thanked for their participation, and excused.
6 The new, false titles were constructed to be weakly related to pictures shown in the first phase (but not
presented in the second phase), but no picture with that exact title had been shown. Considering the small sample
of pictures in this study it was decided that distinct pictures, that did not resemble any of the original titles, might
make the participants realize the titles were false, thus lead to a floor effect.
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Coding of responses
”Name all titles”- task (Part 1: DF). After the distracter task in the first (picture
presentation) phase and again at the beginning of the second phase the participants were asked
to write down the titles of as many pictures as they could remember. If they could not
remember the exact title a tentative title or a description sufficed. These were coded as
partial, and if they remembered the correct title it was coded as such. A second correct
category was established during coding for titles that changed the semantics, but were
otherwise correct. When the participants changed part of the title from singular to plural, or
vice versa, i.e. if the title was ‘doctors and patient’, and the participant wrote ‘doctor and
patient’, it was coded as a correct minus. Although the title had been altered, the alteration did
not seem to be to such a degree that it should be deemed merely “partially remembered”. The
titles were then further plotted according to valence, and whether they appeared in the first or
second list. However, after an initial data analysis it was decided to collapse all 3 categories
into one, since 60 – 90% of the responses in the correct minus and partial categories clustered
around 0, with at least 90% of the participants scoring less than 1, in any category.
Recall and cued recall (Part 2: Memory errors). For the recall tasks during the second
phase the descriptions were coded into 6 distinct categories. Descriptions containing no
errors, regardless of length of the description, were coded as correctly remembered. If the
participants indicated that they could not remember any picture suggested by the false titles,
or if they described the original picture, but explicitly stated the title of that picture (i.e. stated
that “bakers” had been labelled “chefs”), the responses were coded as correctly rejected. If
they described an original picture as belonging to the false title, e.g. describing the “gangster”
picture to the title “robbers”, without mentioning the original title, the response was coded as
(source) confused. Responses where the core details of the picture were described correctly,
but which also contained erroneous details were coded as partial. Some participants chose not
to describe pictures they could not remember and these non-responses were coded as
forgotten. If the participants made an erroneous description of a title, but stated that they had a
distinct feeling they were just making it up, the picture was also coded as forgotten. Only
statements claimed to be true were of interest in this study.
Descriptions not pointing to any picture that had been presented, in any form, or
describing situations relating to the false titles, ended up in the false category. In addition, if
participants described a scene originating from the cues in the original title, but which clearly
indicated a new scene, i.e. the picture they imagined were not the correct one, the response
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also ended up in the false category. For example: the original picture titled “children and cats”
depicted ‘a boy and a girl sitting on a lawn, holding a kitten each’. If the participant described
it as being ‘one girl, sitting on a floor inside a house, with several cats around’, the scene they
“remembered” were clearly not the one they had actually seen.
Errors of omission in the description of people/objects were not considered in this
study, e.g. if someone had a blue sweater, but the participant failed to include this detail, it
was not coded as an error. If the participant claimed the sweater was pink, however, this was
considered to be an error (Error of commission). However, if two people were central in the
picture, and only one was reported, the ‘number of people present’ was coded as an error,
since the scene of the picture could be considered substantially altered.
Results
Part 1: Directed forgetting:
Although it could be claimed that three pictures of each valence category, a total of nine
pictures in each lists, might be considered too few, preliminary analyses indicated that there
was no ceiling effect. The majority had 1-2 correct recalls of each valence category, and very
few remembered all of the titles on any list (≤ 2 participants).
Graph 1
Mean correct recalls of list 1 and 2, at both test sessions, collapsed on group:
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1. test session (immediately after pictures presentation). As expected, the first test,
shortly after the picture presentation phase, did not reveal any main or interaction effects.
Both lists were equal, and there was no difference between the Forget and Remember groups,
replicating the findings in Payne and Corrigan (2007). Further the negative pictures were
remembered better than the positive and the neutral pictures, in accordance with previous
research (e.g. Barnier et al., 2007; Payne & Corrigan, 2007). For the Forget group recall for
the negative pictures was superior compared to the other valences. Despite the lack of
significant difference between the positive and neutral pictures, the scoring pattern did reflect
the differences in arousal. Although not significant, the Remember group had a slightly higher
recall rate on the neutral images than the positive ones, a finding that was not expected,
considering that the positive pictures were more arousing.
A 2 (List 1 vs. 2) X 2 (Group: Forget vs. remember) ANOVA was conducted on the
data collected at the first test session. There was no significant main effect of list or group, nor
did the standard interaction between list and group occur, i.e. there was no directed forgetting
effect. Mean scores for both lists, for both groups, were practically identical.
Graph 2
Mean values on list 1 and 2 for the Remember and Forget groups, at test 1:
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Investigating the differences in valence within each list a 2 (group: Forget vs.
Remember) x 2 (List: 1 vs. 2.) X 3 (Valence: Negative vs. neutral vs. positive) mixed within –
between ANOVA revealed a main effect of valence only, F (2, 55) = 9,491, p < .001, with
more negative pictures recalled than positive and neutral. There was also an interaction
between valence and condition group F (2, 55) = 3,351, p = 0.042, with better memory for the
emotional pictures in the Forget group, and the Remember group scoring higher on the neutral
pictures.
In order to further investigate the interaction a split file analysis was performed,
making paired comparisons of the valences within each group separately, in order to look at
the effect of inhibitory mechanisms on memory performance for each valence7. The analysis
showed that the significant main effect of valence occurred in the Forget group only, F (2, 27)
= 7.727, p = .002, remembering more negative pictures (M = 2,121, SD =.115) than neutral
(M = 1.534, SD =.136) and positive (M = 1.603, SD =.106). There were no other main effects
or interaction effects. Paired comparisons of the various valences revealed a significant main
effect of valence between negative and positive images for both groups (Forget: F (1, 28) =
13.376, p = .001; Remember: F (1, 28) = 5.143, p = .031), but the negative vs. neutral was
only significant for the Forget group (F (1, 28) = 13.928, p < .01). Stated in different terms:
for the Forget group the negative pictures > positive pictures = neutral pictures, but for the
Remember group, negative (M = 1.862, SD = .099) = neutral (M = 1.793, SD = .104), which
again = positive (M = 1.552, SD = .152), and negative > positive. No significant differences
were found between positive and neutral images for either group (p’s > .05). Independent
samples t-tests on each of the valence categories in both lists revealed no statistical
differences between the Forget and Remember groups, on either valence (all ps > .05).
2. test session (1 week after picture presentation). While the lists had been identical on
the first testing they were not at test 2. More pictures were remembered from list 1 than list 2.
Again no group differences were found at any variable.
As on the first test a 2 (List: 1 vs. 2) x 2 (group: Forget vs. Remember) ANOVA was
conducted, to see if the directed forgetting effect had appeared after the one week inter trial
interval. While the list-factor did not reach significance in the first testing, it did come out as a
main effect in the second test session, F (2, 56) = 12.576, p = .001, with more pictures being
remembered from list 1 than list 2 (see graph 1). This pattern could be expected for the
Remember group, but not for the Forget group too, cf. the directed forgetting effect.
7 Considering the low number of pictures of each valence a Bonferroni correction was not carried out in the
analyses, in line with Barnier et al. 2007.
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A 2 (List: 1 vs. 2) x 2 (Group: Forget vs. Remember) x 3 (valence: negative, neutral &
positive) ANOVA revealed a main effect of valence (F (2, 55) = 4.749, p = .013), with again
more negative pictures being remembered (M = 1.552, SD = .074) than neutral (M = 1.328,
SD = .095) and positive (M = 1.336, SD = .068) overall, further supporting the notion of
negative stimuli having a greater impact on memory. There were no further main or
interaction effects.
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In order to investigate whether the valences were treated differently between the
groups a split file within - between ANOVA was conducted, investigating each group
separately. Paired comparisons revealed that negative pictures were preferred over neutral
pictures, in the Forget group only (F (1, 28) = 6.633, p = .016). The negative (M = 1.552, SD
= .112) was further statistically equal to the positive (M = 1.397, SD = 0.97), which again was
equal to the neutral pictures (M = 1.224, SD = .112), with the order of the scorings reflecting
the arousal differences in the valence categories (negative = positive = neutral, negative >
neutral).
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The unexplainable high scoring for the neutral pictures on test 1 for the Remember
group was not apparent on test 2. In fact all valences were now statistically similar (Negative:
M = 1.552, SD = .097; Neutral: M = 1.431, SD = .135; Positive: M = 1.276, SD = .095; all ps
> .05. The pattern on the 1. test, with neutral higher than positive remained, though. As with
the first test session, independent samples t-tests revealed no significant group differences on
either valence category (all ps > .05) on either of the lists, despite minor idiosyncrasies in
relative difference between the valences within each group.
Time:We all know memory fades with time (e.g. Ebbinghaus, 1885-1964, in Smith &
Kosslyn, 2009). However, for list 1 only recall for the negative pictures in the Forget group
changed significantly over the 1 week delay (F (1, 28) = 12.6, p = .001). In other words, the
Forget group had a significantly lower scoring on the negative pictures in list one on the
second testing. All other group x valence scores on list 1 remained stable across the 1 week
delay. The Forget group had a slightly higher mean value (M = 2.21, SD = .152) than the
remember group (M = 1.9, SD = .125) in the first session, but dropped to almost equal values
on the second test session (M = 1.69, SD = .132 vs. M = 1.72, SD = .148) for forget and
remember respectively). Interestingly, the second list showed a significant change over time,
in both groups for all valences (all ps ≤ .025). This could indicate a possible hypermnesia (cf.
Erdelyi & Becker, 1974) for the pictures in list 1, while the pictures in list 2, although the
same as list 1 on first testing, were somehow weakened during the inter test interval.
Part 2: Memory error
Recall that no significant group differences were found in the directed forgetting
experiment, which may have affected the results in this part of the study. Nevertheless it
should still be possible to explore just how easily memory errors may be created.
For the original pictures (pictures the participants had actually seen) only the correct,
partial and false categories were included in the analyses. The confused category contained
too few participants to be included, since this led to a violation of the requirements for the
statistical method used. In addition, the forget category was not of theoretical interest, and
were thus excluded. The partial category was included in the analyses because it is a relative
indication of the erroneous quality of memory, but the main interest of this study was the
entirely correct or entirely false descriptions, and the partial category will thus not be
commented upon.
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On the cued recall task the participants were given a response booklet, were they were
presented with questions asking for more specific details, such as number of people, and
details in clothing and surrounding objects. The questions did not suggest any answers, or
offer any misleading information. For the new, false titles only the correctly rejected,
confused and false categories were used in the analyses.
Original pictures: There was a tendency towards the two groups being relatively equal
in their tendency to give a false or correct description to the original pictures. Only for the
neutral picture in list 1 on the recall task, and the positive picture on list 2 in the cued recall
task, did the analysis reach significance. All other analyses were non-significant. Apart from
the two significant pictures, the rest of the analyses were collapsed on group to look at the
category distribution for all responses.
In the recall task there were more false descriptions of the negative picture and fewest
for the positive, on list 1. The positive picture had the least amount of false responses on list 2
also, with the negative and neutral being almost equal, with about a third of the responses
being false. The positive was also more correct on both lists; compared to negative and
neutral, which again was almost equally correct (table 2). The number of false responses
increased from recall to cued recall on the first list, but declined on the second list for the
negative and neutral pictures. The number of correct responses decreased from recall to cued
recall on both lists. This latter tendency probably reflects an increase in errors on the correct
responses on the recall task, thus having been coded as partially correct on the cued recall.
Table 2
Percentage distribution false & correct on the recall & Cued recall tasks for original
pictures, collapsed on group:
            False           Correct
  Recall / Cued recall    Recall / Cued recall
List 1 List 2 List 1 List 2
Negative        17.1/ 26.2 31.1/ 26.1 31.1/ 26.2        37.8/ 29.8
Neutral 9.5/ 11.1          36.1/ 23.3 40.5/ 20 36.1/ 27.9
Positive 6.7/ 12.8  9.5/ 12.8 55.6/ 36.2 52.4/ 29.8
Recall: Negative N = 35; Neutral N = 42; Positive N = 45
Cued recall: Negative N = 46; Neutral N = 43; Positive N = 47
(Note that the percentage does not sum up to 100%. This is because the partial category was excluded
from further comments, but still used in the analyses.)
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A crosstabs chi square analysis revealed a significant result on the neutral picture (N =
42) in list 1 (p = .011), on the recall task, with the Remember group having more correct
responses than the Forget group, and the Forget group having more false responses (graph 4).
Graph 4
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Note that only 4 people gave a false response, and the group difference here could be
arbitrary.
On the positive picture (N = 47) on list 2 (p = .023), on the cued recall task, the
Remember group was more likely to give a partial account (40.4% vs. 17% of all responses),
while the Forget group was more likely to give a correct response. The Forget group was also
more likely to give a false description, than the Remember group (graph 5).
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Graph 5
Number distribution on false and correct category for each group, on positive picture, list 2,
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False titles: Three titles, indicating a negative (“Robbers”), a neutral (“Bakers”) and a
positive (“Couple on the beach”) scenery were presented in a randomized fashion together
with the titles of the original pictures, to see if this would suffice to produce errors in
memory. A substantial number of the descriptions were false. Contrary to expectations source
confusions were rare. The valences were almost equal in their tendency to be falsely
described, indicating that memory errors is just as likely for negative stimuli, as more benign
ones. Errors increased from the recall to the cued recall task, but more so for the positive
titles, than the negative and neutral. The tendency to reject the false titles decreased for the
positive and neutral, while it increased for the negative title. Source confusions for the
negative picture decreased while it remained fairly stable for the other pictures (table 3). No
significant group differences were found.
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Table 3
Recall / Cued recall - Percentage distribution scoring categories for false titles:
Negative Positive Neutral Mean:
False 31 / 32.8 34.5 / 50 32.8 / 39.7 32.8 / 40.8
Rejected 56.9 / 60.3 62.1 / 44.8 56.9 / 50 58.6 / 51.7
Confused 12.1 / 6.9 3.4 / 5.2 10.3 / 10.3 8.6 / 7.5
In order to see if the Forget group was more or less likely to accept the false titles, a
chi square analysis was conducted to compare the two groups in each of the coding
categories, on both recall and cued recall: false, correctly rejected and confused. The confused
category ended up being removed from the final analysis since there were too few subjects in
the category to fulfil the requirements of the analysis. There were no significant group
differences on either of the false titles (negative N = 51, neutral N = 52, positive N = 568), or
the coding categories, on either recall or cued recall tasks. In other words: both groups were
equally likely to give a false description as to correctly reject the titles.
Percentage of participants giving all correct or false on all the false titles:While
errors were quite prominent in the data material, very few participants gave false descriptions
to all of the false titles. Almost three times as many correctly rejected all of the false titles
while the majority had a mixture of all categories, on the recall task. On the cued recall task
more participants now had false on all categories, and slightly fewer rejected all.
A manual count of the data set revealed that of the 58 participants 5 had false
descriptions to all three false titles (8.6%) on the recall task. 14 correctly rejected all titles
(24.1%). The majority (39/67.2%) had a mixture of false, correctly rejected and confused
responses to the false titles. None had confused responses on all the original titles. On the
cued recall part, which followed immediately after the recall task, 9 out of 58 (15.5%) now
had false responses to all of the false titles, an increase in approximately 6.9% from the recall
task. 12 correctly rejected all titles (20.7%) a drop in 3.4%. 63.8% (37) had a mixture of false,
correctly rejected and confused responses to the false titles, a drop in 3.4%. It appears the
amount of memory errors increased slightly in the short period from the recall task until the
cued recall task.
8 The missing number (58-N) for each group belongs in the confused category.
Attempting to suppress the unwanted 28
Discussion
Part 1: Directed forgetting
The first test session of this study replicated the findings from Payne and Corrigan
(2007), with no directed forgetting effect being found. In addition the negative pictures were
remembered better than the positive and neutral pictures, supporting the general finding that
negative, emotional stimuli are rather difficult to forget9 (e.g. Alexander et al., 2005;
McNally, 2003; Payne & Corrigan, 2007; Porter & Birt, 2001). The Forget group did not
behave in the way that were expected in standard directed forgetting experiments (e.g.
Geraerts & McNally, 2008), but responded in very much the same manner as the Remember
group. The mean values of recall on both lists were virtually identical, indicating that
inhibition of visual stimuli is rather difficult at shorter intervals.
No DF effect was found on the second testing either. Contrary to expectations the two
lists did not remain similar in mean values at the second testing (by either remaining stable or
declining at equal strength). While the mean values for the first list remained (statistically)
stable during the 1 week delay (except for the negative pictures in the Forget group) the mean
values for list two declined. In other words, although they appeared to be identical on the first
testing the underlying qualities of the memory representations must have been different. The
Forget group did not show the expected pattern, of significantly lower scorings on the first list
than the second list, at the second test either. In fact, the scoring pattern was similar to the one
typically seen for the Remember group at standard directed forgetting studies (e.g. Payne &
Corrigan, 2007), and was also equal to the Remember group’s scoring for this study.
To reiterate the initial critiques of the DF paradigm: The experiments that have been
done so far have usually tested memory shortly after the presentation of the stimulus material.
It could thus be claimed that the standard experiments have been a test of suppression/
inhibitory abilities in working memory. In this case DF for emotionally arousing stimuli
seems difficult, if not impossible, which is demonstrated by the near identical scoring for the
Forget and Remember groups. Secondly, it may seem that using word lists may not create the
level of arousal that occurs in more naturalistic settings. When the stimuli are more arousing,
as in the Payne and Corrigan (2007) and the present study, inhibition seems improbable. How
often do we manage to walk out of a situation that made us really uncomfortable, tell
ourselves not to think about it anymore, and completely forget the event within mere minutes
or hours? Most likely, we are unable to. Events that cause strong emotions stay with us for at
9 Positive memories may “form highly vivid and persistent memories” (Berntsen, 2001, p. 136) too, but we may
be less motivated to forget them.
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least a short amount of time (as the Payne & Corrigan, 2007, and test 1 of the present study
indicates) whether we like it or not, and may even intrude when we least want them to
(Berntsen, 2001). More mundane (neutral) events, however, may be more easily put out of
mind (e.g. Payne & Corrigan, 2007; but see Berntsen, 2001), simply because they may not be
important for survival (e.g. Plutchik, 2001). In support of this, the second experiment of the
Jocelyn and Oakes (2005) study that did not find a DF effect for more high salient AMs.
Lastly, it may seem as though the ‘inhibitory patterns’, theorized to be placed over the
memory representation at encoding, leading to worse recall (Racsmány & Conway, 2006),
may not be effective for arousing stimuli. This is indicated by both the stable values on the
TBF list after the delay, and the identical scoring of both groups.
Considering that the Forget group had a higher scoring (though not significant) than
the Remember group on the negative picture in list 1, it may be that suppression of negative
pictures is harder than suppressing positive and neutral pictures, at least in short term. The
Forget group also had higher scoring on the positive picture, but the difference was minute,
and could be due to the Remember group’s relatively poor memory for the positive pictures.
The higher values in the Forget group could indicate that when people attempt to suppress
emotional stimuli in general, and negative pictures in particular, they experience a temporary
rebound similar to the “white bear” effect when they afterwards are asked to recall what they
had been told to suppress (cf. Wegner, et al., 1987). After all, the Forget group is traditionally
expected to show lower values than the Remember group, not higher, however small the
difference may be. How long this rebound effect might exist is unclear, but we can assume it
is for less than a week, since the scores on the negative picture for the Forget group was quite
similar to the Remember group at test 2. Additionally, the valences were equal for the
Remember group at test two, while the negative was still significantly larger than the neutral,
in the Forget group.
The identical scores on test 2 could indicate a regression towards the mean (e.g.
Howitt & Cramer, 2008, p. 153), and a stabilization of memory (e.g. Ebbinhaus’ forgetting
curve, in Smith & Kosslyn, 2009). On the other hand, it cannot be determined from these data
whether the inhibition of the negative pictures had started during the delay, maybe having
resulted in a further drop in mean values for the negative pictures had the inter test interval
been longer. However, one might claim that the pictures weren’t arousing enough (compared
to self experienced events) to form long lasting memories, hence they were most likely
subjected to “ordinary” forgetting (cf. Ebbinghaus, in Smith & Kosslyn, 2009; e.g. Clancy &
McNally, 2005/06). Note that the mean values on the rest of the variables (all valences for
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both groups) in list 1 decreased over the interval, the decrease was just not statistically
significant for the rest of them. The significant drop in the mean values of the negative
pictures for the Forget group could thus be due to a statistical artefact, considering that there
were no significant differences between the Forget and Remember groups.
To sum up: no directed forgetting effect was found at either the first or second test.
While both lists were identical at the first test, they were not at test 2. The first list pictures
remained stable over the delay, the second list pictures had declined significantly.
Additionally, negative pictures had higher mean values than positive and neutral pictures.
With this in mind, what may explain these findings?
Competition between lists: It has been found that in order for directed forgetting to
occur, with inhibition of the first list in the Forget group, the second list needs to be able to
draw attention, and serve as a competitor to the first list. When attention is depleted during
learning of the second list, directed forgetting does not appear, and it has been suggested that
the DF effect depends on the possibility of shifting attentional focus, which then causes
inhibition of the TBF list (Conway et al., 2000). Attention is necessary for memory encoding;
what has not been properly attended to, will not be properly encoded or stored in memory
(Smith & Kosslyn, 2009). Emotional stimuli has the ability to grab attention (Öhman, Flykt &
Esteves, 2001), and it is possible that since both lists were arousing the first list was able to
grab attention to such an extent that the second was unable to divert attention away from the
first, thus no inhibition could occur. It could be that in order to achieve a DF effect for
emotionally arousing stimuli the second list stimuli need to be emotionally “stronger” than the
first. When the first list, or both lists, are low in arousal, as with neutral pictures (e.g. Payne &
Corrigan, 2007) or words (e.g. Wessel & Merchelbarch, 2006), shifting attention to the
second list may be easier.
To draw a parallel to forgetting an unwanted, emotional memory: it may be that this
will only be successful if there are other emotional events (valence may be insignificant) that
are more arousing, and thus capable of distracting attention from the unwanted memory (e.g.
Conway et al., 2000; Experiment 2 in Wegner et al. 1974). If no such event exists, it may be
that forgetting becomes difficult, and the memory remains strong and enduring.
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Interference: The traditional DF pattern10 has been thought to involve proactive
interference for the Remember group when learning the second list, while the Forget group is
released from this interference by the forget instruction (e.g. Bjork, 1970; Payne & Corrigan,
2007). Since the lists were identical at the first test, it is doubtful that any interference
hampered the learning of the second list, thus it cannot explain the lower test 2 scorings. The
lower means cannot reflect inhibition either, since both groups were instructed to remember
list two (the ‘forget’ instruction is thought to initiate inhibition, cf. Barnier, et al. 2007) and
both groups scored in the same way. It may be that the theorized interference impaired the
second list’s ability to form long lasting memory traces (e.g. Bjork, 1970); hence memory was
weakened during the delay. Of course, it could be a combination of both interference and lack
of competition: a highly memorable first list that “confiscates” attentional resources, and a
second list incapable of competing with the first, once these resources have been allocated.
Note that this would affect the long term memory of the pictures, since the lists were
processed and encoded to an equal extent into working memory. It is also possible that the
first list occupied working memory, causing a processing “overload” which made it harder to
form long term traces of the second list (e.g. Passer & Smith, 2007).
Although the two lists were identical at list 1, and presumably identical in memory, the
underlying memory characteristics must have been different. These findings seem to support
the notion that a one-time testing of a phenomenon such as inhibition does not provide a full
picture of the memory representations of the stimuli. The findings of the present study are in
line with studies investigating long term effects of other methods used to study inhibition or
suppression, which have also found a lack of long term effects of suppression attempts
(McLeod & Macrae, 2001; Nørby, Lange & Larsen, 2009).
Attentional redirection: The finding that DF requires shift in attention (cf. Conway et
al., 2000) may indicate that worse recall does not involve inhibition, but may be due to a
defective processing of whichever list receives less attention. In studies using low arousing
stimuli this will be the first list for the Forget group, which is explicitly instructed to shift
focus to list two, and a “weak” list 1 is unable to prevent this shift. The second list may
receive less attention in the Remember group because they are focussed on keeping the first
list in memory while learning the second list (interference). In this respect, trying to keep
information in memory may lead to divided attention for the second list, and encoding suffers.
This may also explain why the Remember group has better memory for the first list on
10 With the Forget group having higher recall for list 2 than list 1 stimuli, and the Remember group having better
recall for list 1 over list 2 stimuli (Geraerts & McNally, 2008).
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traditional DF studies (e.g. Conway et al. 2000), at least when low arousal stimuli are used,
because attention is not overloaded at that point. When the first list is too emotional attention
may be immediately drawn to it (e.g. Öhman, Flykt & Esteves, 2001), and while arousal may
enhance memory for list 2 at short term, making the lists equal (e.g. Payne & Corrigan, 2007;
this study), less resources may be allocated to forming long lasting memory traces of it.
For the Forget group it may also be that inhibition attempts of emotionally arousing
stimuli draws upon the attentional resources to such an extent that it both abolishes short term
inhibition (e.g. experiment 4, Conway et al., 2000) and further weakens long term storage of
list 2 (Conway, et al., 2000). However, this latter hypothesis does not account for the near
identical values of the Remember group and the Forget group, unless the different theorized
attentional overload mechanisms for each group has similar results. The hypothesized
attentional redirection also does not explain why DF effect seems to be lifted at recognition
tasks. However, Benjamin (2006) discovered a trend towards a DF effect on list 2 in a
recognition test, possibly indicating that the second list is in fact not encoded in equal
strength, for both groups.
Previous studies compared to the present: So why is it that DF effects are observed
with emotional words (Conway et al. 2000; Wessel & Merchelbach, 2006) and AMs (Barnier
et al., 2007, experiment 3; Jocelyn & Oakes, 2005), but not pictures (Payne & Corrigan, 2007;
this study)? The likely explanation is that pictures lead to higher emotional activation causing
better memory consolidation, thus better memory for the items (Smith & Kosslyn, 2009, pp.
348-352). Barnier et al. (2007) used AMs that were more than a month old, and it is possible
that even though the events were arousing at the time of occurrence, and are remembered as
having been arousing, they may not have been able to activate strong enough emotional
reactions at the time of the study to prevent inhibition from taking place. It could thus be, as
Payne and Corrigan (2007) speculated when words are concerned, that older AMs include
knowledge of emotions at the time, but may not evoke an emotional state (at retrieval), and
the latter may not be as easily inhibited. While Jocelyn and Oakes (2005) used recent
autobiographical memories the forget group received the forget instruction at least a day after
the event took place, which may have caused enough emotional decline for the instruction to
be effective. It is also possible that the memories in their study were too low on emotional
arousal in the first place. Maybe emotional events can only be inhibited after its potential to
evoke emotional activation at retrieval has diminished. Previous studies may have been based
on low arousal, while the present study, and the study of Payne and Corrigan (2007), would
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be equal to receiving a forget instruction shortly after an emotionally salient event had taken
place. In this situation, inhibition seems improbable.
The fact that the DF effect was not observed even after a week may indicate that
inhibitory patterns were not encoded simultaneously with the stimulus material, as the
episodic inhibition view, theorized by Racsmány and Conway (2006) suggests (see also
Conway et al., 2000). When a stimulus is arousing it may be that these “commands” would
have to be initiated at a different point in time, possibly during a later retrieval attempt.
Arousal level at retrieval may then again mediate the effect of this later suppression/inhibition
attempt. In other words: for the participants in this study to have been able to inhibit memory
for the TBF pictures, they would have had to receive a forget instruction at a later point in
time, after the emotional qualities of the memories had decreased to a sufficient degree for
inhibition to become possible. In support of this, Jocelyn and Oakes (2005, experiment 2) did
not find a DF effect for the highly salient events, even though the forget instructions were
given some time after the events had taken place. It is possible that the arousing qualities of
those events had not decreased sufficiently.
In relation to forgetting traumatic events: traumas might not be suppressed unless the
emotionally arousing qualities have declined. To the extent that the events “leave scars upon
the cerebral tissue” (cf. William James) inhibition seems unlikely (e.g. Berntsen, 2001). This
is in line with previous studies on traumatic memories where it has been found that the more
traumatic the event the better it is remembered (Alexander et al., 2005). Alternatively a more
potent distractor may be required (e.g. Wegner et al., 1987). Future studies should attempt to
find the arousal threshold for when suppression is possible, and when it is not.
However, there is a possibility that the recall task at the end of the presentation phase
may have lifted the inhibitory mechanisms that would otherwise have been in operation
during the inter test interval. Racsmány and Conway (2006) postulated that “the pattern of
activation/inhibition over representations in the memory can be altered for at least some time
after encoding” (p. 48). It is possible that if the initial recall task had been excluded, and the
participants received an instruction to forget or remember the pictures during the delay, then
the DF effect would have occurred at the second testing.
The present study does not render previous DF studies useless. It merely suggests that
the effect is mediated by emotional arousal to such a degree that DF (i.e. intentional
forgetting) may not work when the TBF items still cause emotional activation. The results of
previous studies may thus be limited to stimuli or memories of lesser arousing qualities and
generalizations to more emotionally arousing memories may thus be restricted.
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Part 2: Memory errors
In part two of the experiment the quality of the memory representations of the pictures
was investigated, with a recall and a cued recall task. No clear predictions were made for this
part of the study, as it was mostly exploratory in nature. It was anticipated, however, that the
results in this part of the study would be linked to the results on the DF study. This was
confirmed. No group differences were found, except for the neutral picture on list 1 on the
recall task, and the positive picture on list 2 on the cued recall task. Although interesting, the
positive and neutral pictures were not the main concern of this paper, and this apparent group
difference will thus not be discussed further. Since none of the other variables showed any
group differences the following discussion concerns the over all tendencies for all
participants, collapsed by group.
There were fewer false descriptions for the pictures in list 1, which were better
remembered, than for the pictures in list 2. Contrary to expectations, memory for the negative
pictures in list 1 had a higher rate of false responses than the positive and the neutral pictures.
The error rate on the positive valence was slightly higher on list 2, but it was still lower than
for the negative and the neutral, at either list. On the latter two valences the number of false
descriptions was substantially higher on list 2. Their error rates were also quite similar.
The amount of errors increased for most of the variables from the recall task to the
cued recall task, except for the negative and neutral on list 2. Additionally the number of
correct descriptions decreased for all of the valences on both lists. This could possibly
indicate the appearance of errors in the initially correct memories. In other words: it may be
that correct recall descriptions included errors on the subsequent cued recall task, hence being
coded as partially correct. No expectations were made concerning differences between the
recall and cued recall task, but the increase in erroneous responses was somewhat surprising,
considering the lack of external pressure, and the fact that the cued recall task took place mere
minutes after the recall task.
For the false titles it was expected that the negative title would produce less false
descriptions than the positive and neutral. This expectation was based on the assumption that
the negative original pictures would be so memorable that the participants would realize that
they had not seen a picture of the scene indicated by the false title. However, valence did not
seem to make a difference. The participants were just as likely to give a false response to the
title indicating a negative picture as to the positive and neutral titles, with about a third of the
descriptions being false. There were no significant group differences for this tendency.
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The lack of observed inhibition, or suppression, in the Forget group made it
impossible to answer one of the research questions: What happens to the quality of stimuli
that have been suppressed, and then later attempted retrieved? Nevertheless it may still be
possible to draw some inferences about memory quality.
Memory stability: First of all, memory errors were less likely for the first list, for
which memory remained fairly stable over the 1 week delay on the DF task, than for list 2,
which showed a significant decline in mean values. This may indicate that emotionally
arousing pictorial stimuli are not just relatively enduring in memory; they are also relatively
accurate, when properly encoded. They are not fault free, however (e.g. Smith & Kosslyn,
2009), as indicated by the error rates. Rather counterintuitive, the highest false rate on list 1
was for the negative picture, and the lowest for the positive picture.
Interestingly the positive pictures were least erroneous on both lists. The false rates for
the neutral and negative images were a lot higher on the second list, and the error rate came
close to the error rate for the false titles on the recall task (c.f. tables 2 and 3). This may
indicate that when memory fades errors become more likely (e.g. Loftus, 1992). It is possible
that when memory appears vague there may be an increased tendency to describe the first
thing one recalls that seems familiar (e.g. Garry & Polaschek, 2000), rather than continue to
search for the correct memory. It is however possible that because the participants had a
relatively poor memory for list 2, they may have treated the original list 2 titles as “false
titles”, which may explain the similar error rate.
The rate of memory errors increased slightly from the recall to the cued recall task,
except for the negative and the neutral pictures on list 2. It is unclear why only these two
variables showed a decrease in amount of errors. One possibility could be that the participants
chose to refrain from describing a picture they were unsure of, at the cued recall task, thus the
responses were later coded as forgotten. These pictures did after all have a surprisingly high
error rate at the recall task. The tendency of both higher and lower rate of false responses
could also be due to “the testing effect”, where repeated attempts at recalling information
increases likelihood of both increased error and accuracy rate (McDermott, 2006). Concerning
the increase in errors, it might have been caused by the erroneous mental images, which were
cued by the false titles, appearing to be more familiar. When processing of erroneous
information increases in fluency, it may more likely to be perceived as true (e.g. Garry &
Wade, 2005). Research suggests that memories return to a labile state upon reactivation,
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leaving the memory traces vulnerable to alterations (see Nader, 2003, for a discussion).
Which mechanism might explain the rise in errors in this study is unclear.
Bear in mind that no visual suggestions were provided, nor were any detailed narrative
descriptions of the false titles given. Thus any distortion in visual memory, arising from the
generation of false scenes in the minds of the participants, happened then and there, without
any direct external pressure, except for a casual request to spend a short time (30-60 seconds)
to imagine the picture belonging to the title. The logical response would have been to
misattribute the mildly related previously presented picture to the false title, but the
descriptions provided by the participants indicated a quite different visual scene to anything
they had actually witnessed. In response to the title “Robbers”, which were mildly related to
the original picture titled “Gangsters” (see appendix) showing a close up of three men (two
blacks, one white) pointing a pistol at the camera, one participant described:
Three men with black balaclavas, running. They’re outside, in the picture, asphalted
street, gloomy surroundings. There may have been someone being robbed, but I
cannot remember. The clearest is the image of the three masked men running with a
rifle (my translation).
The over all results seem to indicate that even mildly suggestive influences may be
enough to significantly alter memory. Recall that a description of an original title were coded
as false only when it was considered altered to such a degree that it no longer resembled the
original picture. For the false titles only descriptions that could not be linked to any original
picture (i.e. source confusion), either through description or by stating the title of the original
picture, were considered false. Thus by merely presenting an associative title entirely new
visual scenes were created in the minds of the participants, even though the title could be
related to a previously seen picture. It may seem like memory is easier to manipulate than
initially expected.
However, there are other factors beside memory malleability that may explain the
results in the present study:
Source confusion: This was predicted to be the most prominent response to the false
titles, rather than giving entirely false descriptions. In this study source confusion would be if
the participants described the original pictures, of which the false titles were based, when
probed with the false titles. However, source confusion errors were rare (table 3). It’s possible
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that the participants actually remembered the original picture and its title, concluded that the
false title did not refer to that specific picture, rejected it, and then proceeded to describe the
first mental image that felt familiar (e.g. Garry & Polaschek, 2000). The responses of some of
the participants during debriefing may support this hypothesis. However this seems to have
been the case for only a minority of the participants.
Social factors in the testing situation: Although steps were made to minimize
influencing factors one cannot preclude the possibility of the “good participant effect”, i.e. the
participants attempting to please the experimenter (Bordens & Abbott, 2005). When presented
with titles they could not remember, they may have chosen to describe whatever came to
mind, in order to not appear like a “bad” participant. On the other hand, the fact that this study
was led by a student (maybe lacking authority) may have made them feel less compelled to
produce accurate descriptions, or to withhold false ones, compared to, for instance, a police
interrogation. However, during debriefing, when the students were informed about the real
purpose of the study and told which titles had been false probes, almost all seemed surprised
by the errors they had made. The majority indicated that they initially believed that they had
not seen the picture before, but then started to doubt their memory, and eventually ended up
describing a mental image they believed to have been the picture they had seen. There is thus
reason to believe that they attempted to perform the tasks conscientiously, and made their best
effort to give correct answers. The main cause of accepting the false probes, as indicated by
the majority of the participants, seem to be initial self doubt in their own memory, followed
by a hesitant acceptance of the visual image that “popped up” during mental imagery, and
which seemed somewhat familiar.
The participants were instructed to indicate whether they were certain or uncertain of
the descriptions they provided to the titles, but since not everyone complied with this
instruction this factor could not be explored further. However, of those that did include an
evaluation almost all seemed to be uncertain of the false descriptions they provided.
The effects of warning: Suggestibility influences have been found to drop when the
participants are warned that they have been exposed to erroneous information (Lindsay,
1990). The fact that the participants were not instructed to withhold responses if they could
not remember the title may thus have influenced the tendency to accept vague visual images
that would otherwise have been rejected. After all, we live in a very visual world, where
television and internet makes pictures and videos readily available for consumption. We may
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therefore all at one point in time have seen other visual stimuli that resembled scenes
suggested by the titles that were used as false probes in this study. It is therefore no surprise
that the false titles may have become misattributed to these already stored “visions”. The
surprise is the ease with which this was done.
Limitations of the present study: The results in this study seem to indicate that even
though people remember the correct verbal label of a visual scene, it does not necessarily
mean that the scene they see in their minds eye corresponds very well with what they actually
saw. However, there are some limitations in connecting this study to the DF study. This part
of the experiment contained only a selection of the pictures that were presented, and it is quite
likely that the pictures that were chosen were not remembered by some of the participants, i.e.
the titles were treated in the same way as the new, “false” titles, hence they ended up getting
those wrong. The amount of false descriptions could mirror this. It is also possible that the
participants had excellent memory for the pictures that were not selected, thus this study may
present a skewed representation of memory quality, in favour of false memory
representations.
Regardless, it seems that even negative emotional memories may be easily tempered
with. Granted, the pictures in the present study cannot be put on par with traumatic
autobiographical events. However, one may speculate whether the false mental images that
had intruded into the memories of the participants would have been able to take hold and,
with time, they could have been lured into believing that they had actually witnessed the event
first hand. On the other hand, it might require more “effort” on behalf of both researcher and
participant to create false AMs. The studies cited in the present study employed social
pressure, a false narrative, and also required that the participants spent some time trying to
reminisce (e.g. Loftus & Pickrell, 1995; Wade, Garry, Read & Lindsay, 2002; Garry & Wade,
2005). AMs possess certain qualities, such as “fundamental significance for the self, for
emotions, and for the experience of personhood”, (Conway & Pleydell-Pearce, 2000, p. 261),
not found in pictures that have been viewed on a computer screen. Nevertheless, if it is
possible to create a memory for a scene not previously witnessed by merely offering an
associative title, it could potentially have implications for real life court cases, and therapy
practices that still rely on mental imagery techniques. If proper care is not taken, memory
errors may cause severe problems for both patients and innocent people (e.g. Loftus &
Ketcham, 1994; Magnussen, 2004; www.discovery.com, 2010).
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Appendix:
Pictures from IAPS database:
Pictures selected for ‘Part 2: Memory errors’ marked with asterix.
Pictures associated with false title marked by hash tag.
Number in
database
Given name Valence Description:
Scene, then persons left to right
6242# ”Gangstere” Negative - Close up, waist up, in front of a fence
- White man, black t-shirt, glasses, caps
- Black man, bear chest, blue & white bandana, points pistol
at camera
- Black man black t-shirt
6315* “Slag” Negative - Close up, waist up, car in background
- White man, dark hair, red t-shirt. Right hand in a strangle
grip around woman’s neck, left arm in motion to slap
woman
- White woman, blue & white armless t-shirt. Head turned
left, pained facial expression
9250* “Leger og
pasient”
Negative - Semi-close up, from knees up, outside, asphalt & wooden
wall in background, two people partially visible on right
- Asian man, white doctor’s coat, glasses, carries torso of:
- Asian, female patient: injured, very bloody top,
unconscious, dark skirt
- Asian man, white doctor’s coat, yellow ribbon left arm.
Carries legs of patient. White shirt, dark trousers, glasses
- They seem to be in a hurry
9414 “Mann med
gevær”
Negative - Outside, buildings in background, green hedge in front, dirt
road
- A hand holding a rifle, barely visible
- Black man face down on dirt road, white t-shirt, yellow
trousers, left hand raised towards:
- White man pointing rifle at black man. Multicoloured,
chequered sweater, blue jeans, brown shoes. Short, blond
hair.
9429 “Redsel” Negative - Outside in a street. Front person waist up, people in
background in full figure.
- Frightened women and children running. White, blonde
women, dark jackets. Girls 8-12 years old, crying, school
uniform, red ties.
- Policeman with back turned
9433 “Død mann” Negative - Outside; grey, paved street.
- Dark skinned man lying on street, visible from knees to
head. Blue jeans, red t-shirt. Blood around his head,
presumed dead.
- Older man, blue jeans, red t-shirt, holding bike, looking at
dead man
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- Woman, blue t-shirt, white skirt, head not visible, faced
dead man.
- Two dogs, light brown. One appears to be licking the
blood.
2272 “Gutt” Neutral - Large, red wall with the word “Oui” in large, white letters.
- Black boy, 8-12 years, white t-shirt, blue shorts.
- 3 girls walks past on right at pavement, one looks at boy
2390* “Mann og
kvinne”
Neutral - Inside, red, brick wall with lit fireplace in background.
Close up, man and woman sitting at table
- White woman, white shirt, blue stethoscope around neck,
white tea cup in right hand, short, blond hair, black ear rings
- White man, short, dark hair, blue and white chequered
shirt. Turned towards woman, away from camera
2396* “Par i trapp” Neutral - Inside, large blue and grey staircase, white railing on left,
elder couple walking down stairs, towards camera
- Asian man, black cap, black & grey jacket, light blue jeans,
animal cage right hand. Black bag over left shoulder
- Asian woman, red-ish hair, light brown jacket, black
trousers, blue bag on left arm
- Gloomy, facial expressions
2579# “Kokker” Neutral - Back alley of shopping street, Asian looking
- Two people making dumplings in the street, bamboo
steamers, table
- Asian man/woman, white jacket & apron, dark trousers
- Asian man, white jacket and hat
- Two people barely visible on the left
2595 “Kvinner
samtaler”
Neutral - Close up, waist up, sitting outside a white house
- Back woman, half long black, wavy hair. White and light
blue, striped shirt, with elbow-long sleeves.
- Black woman, half-long black, straight hair. Sleeveless
white and blue striped shirt with buttoned front. Beer in left
hand.
- Brown bag between them.
7506 “Gamblere” Neutral - Inside a gambling casino, people barely visible in
background, two men behind central figures, half visible.
- white man in tuxedo, glasses, turned away from camera
- white man, blue and white chequered jacket, placing a bet
- Half visible man, light blue jacket, blue tie, placing bet
- White woman, long, blonde hair, yellow jacket, black shirt
underneath
2091* “Barn og
katter”
Positive - Outside, on a lawn, trees in background, sunny.
Children 8-12 sitting on their knees, full body visible.
- White boy, short blonde hair, white, sleeveless shirt with
thin, blue stripes, blue short, holding white and orange-
coloured kitten, facing girl on right of photo
- White girl, long blonde hair, smiling. White sleeveless
shirt with purple & orange flowers, red shorts. Holding
white and orange-coloured kitten. Facing boy on left of
photo.
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2395* “Glade
damer”
Positive - Close up, shoulders up. Three generations black women.
- Young, half-long wavy black hair, wide smile, jeans
printed t-shirt
- Elder woman, white half-long hair, smiles, blue shirt
- Middle aged woman, short, black hair, wide smile, purple
and gold printed shirt
2398 “Båttur” Positive - Outside at the sea, red and white speedboat.
- Two men in boat, partly visible.
- Two women on water, to the left of boat, wearing bikinis.
One wearing black cap.
- Two young girls sitting on boat. On left yellow and blue
safe jacket, dark blonde hair, pony tail. On right; blue safe
jacket, glasses, light blonde hair, pony tail.
5831# “Far og
sønn”
Positive - Outside, beach by the sea, surroundings all blue, seagulls
overhead
- Man with blue shorts, squatting. Lifting left arm to feed
seagulls
- Toddler, naked.
8499 “Berg og
dalbane”
Positive - close up of a man and two children on a roller coaster.
Large yellow sign on left, with black arrow pointing down,
“Down” underneath in black letters.
- White man, blue t-shirt, glasses, smiling, sitting behind:
- White boy on left, 6-8 years, short blonde hair, blue t-shirt,
screaming
- White girl on right, purple t-shirt, red jacket over. Half
long blonde hair, screaming, looking slightly frightened.
8540* “Medalje-
vinnere”
Positive - Close up of three white women, waist up, presumably on a
podium (not seen)
- Short blonde hair, Blue t-shirt with white stars, red stripe -
flag of USA. Silver medal around neck, lifts bouquet of
flowers with right arm. Bites lower lip. Faces right, away
from camera.
- Short, blonde hair, same costume as woman on left. Gold
medal round neck. Raises bouquet of flowers with right arm,
smiles.
- Short, blonde hair. White t-shirt, black stripes under arm,
stripes in colours of German flag over left breast. Bronze
medal round neck. Raises bouquet of flowers with right arm.
